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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

THESTA'I E O F I I IA II

:

Plaii ltil i/K espoi idei it,

: •

v.

:

FRANCISCO A. CANDEDO,

: •

Defci idai it /Petitioner.

:

.,

•• *•

v

J U R I S D I C T I O N A L SFA T E M E N T
y - m u a n 4. 2008, the 1 Jtah Court of Appeals issued State v. Candedo, 2008 11 f
Arp 7! 1" :".-... -"
A» .:

'

^memorandum csecisr.
-u 1 i;

the Utah Court of Appeals on

;
j

:

\

* >:•

-."•

-: ••

t

• isco Candedo\s Petition for Vvni of Certiorari to

\ :. ?.l)08. See Order daied Ji.!> ) 1. 2008 (attached at

Addendum B). Jurisdiction is conferred ,-\> ; : .i., Court pursuai.; .

\:u.

. . ..

>

78. \, 3 102(5) ( fi id C( )de R ec< >dificati< )i I 2008)
SI A I VE M E N T O F ISSUES A N D S T A N D A R D S OF R E V I E W
Issue 1: "Whetl ICI the imposition of a nine-year prt>rh>,:, Mary ici,": \ :o;.:;,.:
I 1 ! I il n m e t N i I L ' J I I In i i l i u p i i, n ik*,>

I Uii n d.ilnl lul ,

Standard of Review: Fhis Court "'will set aside a sentence imposed by the trial
court if the sentence represents an abuse of discretion, if the trial judge fails to consider

.

Male v. ui'uomib, 779 P.2d 1 133, 1135 (Utah 19&J) ^mi^rial and end citations

omitted); see State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, TJ59, — P.3d — (noting this Court will
overturn "trial court's sentencing decision" if "'it exceeds statutory or constitutional
limits'" (citation omitted)); State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ^66, 52 P.3d 1210.
To decide whether Candedo's sentence exceeds constitutional limits, this Court
will consider the constitutionality of Utah's probation statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1
(Supp. 2005).] Questions concerning the constitutionality of a statute are "reviewfed] for
correctness." State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31,1110, 137 P.3d 726; see Jones v. Utah Bd. of
Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53,1|9, 94 P.3d 283 (holding statutory and constitutional
interpretation "is a task we perform without deference to the trial court's determinations"
(citation omitted)); State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4,1J8, 84 P.3d 1171.
Issue 2: "Whether the court of appeals erred in holding Petitioner's due process
arguments could not be raised under rule 22(e) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure."
Order dated July 11,2008.
Issue 3: "Whether the court of appeals erred in holding exceptional circumstances
did not justify treatment of Petitioner's due process arguments on the merits." Order
dated July 11,2008.
Standard of Review for Issues 2 and 3: On certiorari, this Court reviews "the
decision of the court of appeals and not that of the [trial] court." State v. Hansen, 2002

Candedo was sentenced on September 12, 2005. Thus, unless otherwise
specified, citations to section 77-18-1 refer to the 2005 version of the statute. See
Addendum C. This Court should note, however, that no amendments to section 77-18-1
since 2005 affect the substance of Candedo's argument on appeal. See Utah Code Ann. §
77-18-1 (Supp. 2008).
2

I I I I .'.\ 1|2:\ h < I', ul (^0 ii.|iiulaiion and \ ilalion mini led i Hi is < 'mul reviews "the
decisioii of the court of appeals lor correctness." Id. (quotation and citation omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STA 1 I ITS, \N1) RULIvN
'I I In1 issues

I he Inllnuini' m i|i kn itiiiulp

• At)ih iitlutn l 1

uniied States Constitution Amendment XIV Due Process;
• : iah Consliiutimi \rli\Je [. Seclion "7 - Diic Process;
. I.,:; ^ u i u

., ,

,'

I 'n ihali n-

77-27-i (2003) - Dcliilitioii of Probation.
STATEMENT O F CASE AND FACTS 2
Cai idedo was charged will i. four conni-, •„>•; ^\,r.w
""'•

' •

. • • ,i -...

. ucgnv : vi^vv 5

' V--iv - vl.--- • . nc count of sales b> an unlicensed

agent, a third degree felon), one count of employing an unlicensed agent, a third degree
felony, and one count of pattern of unia^ iui a^iM'ity. a second degree felom Oi it f la;; ' 3 1., 2005 Cai idedo pleaded gi lilty t : • :.)i it: cc )i n it : f sect irities fraud, a
second degree felony, one count of sales by an unlicensed broker-dealer or agent, a third
degree felony, and one count of employing an unlicensed broker-dealer or agent, a u,rd
degree icimis. r

'0,-ON, ' iL' , h 1 '•

in 11 mi in iln Slaie ameni ' in «fi si ni ^^ in

remaining charges against Mr. Candedo iii this case" and to "recommend orohaiion and if
appropriate, a jan term "
incarcerated

r

n- ;;_ .s-:-,-.

" 1 " 'Ha: presentence report r e c o m m e n d s ;;a; r a n c e c r 'he
. . •• ,-

" rfhe underlying facts wl this case are not relevant to determining the issues ori
certiorari review.
3

On September 12, 2005, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. R. 244; 270.
The trial court did "not believe that Mr. Candedo had the same level of responsibility as
[the co-defendant], although he has responsibility." R. 270:34. "What I think is the most
fair thing to do with him is to have him serve some time, and then to work for a long time
paying as much money back as humanly possible." R. 270:34.
Based on this reasoning, the trial court sentenced Candedo to a term of one to
fifteen years for the second degree felony, and two terms of zero to five years for each of
the third degree felonies. R. 245; 270:34-35; see Addenda D, E. The trial court ordered
the prison terms to run concurrently and ordered Candedo to pay restitution. R. 246;
270:35. The trial court then suspended the prison terms, ordered Candedo to serve 365
days in jail, and placed Candedo on supervised probation for "36 months on each count,"
resulting in a total probationary period of 108 months. R. 246; 270:35. Explaining, the
trial court said, "That's nine years because of the amount of money that you've got to pay
back." R. 270:35. Following imposition of the sentence, defense counsel asked, "Your
Honor, may I just politely inquire, do you have a power to --?" R. 270:35. Interrupting,
the trial court responded, "I can give 36 months on each of three felonies that he's
convicted of." R. 270:35. Candedo filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 247-48.
At the time of Candedo's sentencing hearing, the court of appeals' interpretation
of the probation statute in State v. McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, 110 P.3d 149, cert,
denied, 124 P.3d 251 (Utah 2005), and State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979 (Utah Ct. App.
1993), cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994), was settled law. Those cases held the
probation statute imposes a 12- or 36-month limit on probation. See McDonald, 2005 UT
4

•IV ''

'

^MOIIJMMK ^

'

•».-"-

O n D c c c m b e r 19, 2006, this Court issued State v. Wallace, 2006 IIT 86. 1 ?n P ?d
540.

Iii Wallace, this Court interpreted the probation stati ite to say u a court may

1 en i lii ia.1 c probatioi i f c i a i eloi ly a.1 tl lii ly si: ;: i i 101 ill is, c i ill I i lay 1:::!, i i lii ia.l e probal ioi i lit any
. • i^'ii "' Wallace, 2006 U T 86 at ^|13 (citation omitted). "AJmilledN. when re.id n.
this fashion, the pn*\ ision regarding 36 months is nearly meaningless/' id. iliu ;i, •
C o u r 1 n't* ..

::iv a e * ^ . :.. . v. .; v J i a l h i M i

's -• f

\ i1 In nil u r . a i I HIL",

• .. *..

ILL i iRib, Utah law "provides no statutor) limitation on the length

of probation a trial court ma\ impose." Id. at ^f 14.
0ri

annca

"v - .

v andedo argued that the probation :-.• .^ .

:

:- w-^ . . .;. V\dju.a,

:uiu U.b. constitutions." Candedo, 2008

UT App 4 at ^ f l , 5. He asked the court of appeals to reach the issue "under rule 22(e) of
:

k- ! V:h Rules of Criminal Procedure, or, alternatively, 1aider the exceptional

c1'

•. v -

*

!

*

cich tlle merits

of his due process argument. Id. at ^]5-10. •
"w MMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mils C mill .liM"ld 1 WI.I ruaifa: I .unledn' nii"-v i! M
| ohnl M »n.ir> pan >d
violates due process. First, Utah's probation statute is not rational!} related u- ihe
legislate eh-staled purpose of probation. '
rcna.

i*n«ion

i ,v: a-

Wallace ^ >w e\* - *:

:

]T

lah, the purpose of probation is

.•••-. .
-^hauoii aialule is not rationally related to achieving

5

rehabilitation because it authorizes a trial court to impose a probationary period of any
length, or to impose probation without specifying any termination date at all.
Rehabilitation, if it is achieved at all, will be achieved within a relatively short
period of time. Research shows that the rehabilitative purposes of probation are
accomplished within five years. If probation lasts beyond this time, it undermines
rehabilitation by driving the probationer to revert to his old lifestyle, needlessly adding to
the overcrowding of prisons and jails, and diluting AP&P's already meager resources.
In this case, the trial court imposed 108 months of probation. This probationary
period is three times as long as the 36-month probationary limit apparently contemplated
by the Utah Legislature, and far longer than necessary to determine whether Candedo can
be successfully rehabilitated. As such, it violates due process because it is
counterproductive to the State's legitimate governmental interest in rehabilitation.
Second, the probation statute implicates a fundamental liberty interest and is not
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Probation is generally reserved for
young or unhardened offenders who are likely to be rehabilitated. It achieves
rehabilitation by limiting an offender's freedom, compelling him to comply with specific
standards of conduct, reducing his constitutional rights, and threatening him with
incarceration. If a defendant is selected as a person likely to be rehabilitated and is
placed on probation, then he has a fundamental interest in shedding probation's
requirements and regaining his liberty once the purposes of probation are achieved.
Lengthy probationary periods are not narrowly tailored to serve the legislativelystated purpose of probation. In particular, Candedo's nine-year probationary period is
6

Inui w i t s Inn^ei lliMii llif" li\i' \i"n limit period idrnlil'inl hs research as beneficial to
rehabilitation. "'1. hus, this Court should reverse bceause Candedo's nine-year probatioi lary
period I> i- •• ::a.r:' "--^v 'nilorcd to serve a compelling state interest.
i in. i n\\\-\ MMjii i 11 ,R li ( 'iindcdi» ' dm piucess ai'Miinciii iinilei ni]c°°(e). When
a defendant is challenging his sentence, this Court has said rule 22(e) is sweeping and is
broad enough to ei icompass constitutional violations, including due process violations.
n

I u\ . '.mien

n appeal, Candalo UitilleiiL'r. Ilie

iMid« > '« -1• i pnnrs 1 . < 1,'iiise.

is ('our: -Mould use rule 22(e) to reach the merits of Candedo's argument.
fhis Court shoi ild also reach the argument inider the exceptional circumstances
doctrine. Rxcepiiv».ia. ciicum^Lances exi-.. ,xe^.u.>e ,- '
•

• ;.

: - • c .•

•: statute as imposing a 36-month limit on probation.

Phis Court did not issue Wallace until lakr

Accordingly, at the time he was sentenced,

Candedo had no warning that he needed to armie llu , i\.. .UK ,;

l -\...

;; ,

process because, as interpreted by Utah law, it did not. Thus, this Court should invoke
the exceptional circumstances doctrine to reach Candedo's due process argument.

ARGUMENT

1 1HS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE
IMPOSITION OF A NINE-YEAR PROBATIONARY PERIOD
VIOLATED CANDEDO'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
"No Stale •,. ..

process of law." U.S. Const, amend. X\\ . $ i, el. 2, see Utah Const, an. 1, § 7 , 'No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.") Under
7

the due process clause, if a statute implicates "fundamental rights," then it is subject a to a
'heightened degree of scrutiny.'" Tindley v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist, 2005 UT 30, ^[28,
116 P.3d 295 (citation omitted); see Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, 1J30, 103 P.3d 135.
This heightened degree of scrutiny says the State may not infringe on a fundamental
liberty interest '"unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.'" Washington v. Glueksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citation omitted).
Alternatively, if a statute "does not infringe upon a fundamental right," then it is
subject "to rational basis review." Tindley, 2005 UT 30 atffi[28-29;see Judd, 2004 UT
91 at *p0. Rational basis review requires a statute to "rationally further a legitimate
governmental interest." State v. Martinez, 2000 UT App 320, ^24, 14 P.3d 114 (citation
omitted); see Tindley, 2005 UT 30 at ^{27. A statute does not satisfy the rational-basis
test if it "has no rational relationship to a legislatively stated purpose or, if not stated, to
any reasonably conceivable legislative purpose." Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 580 (Utah
1993) (citations omitted). "[T]he presumption requires a court to presume that the
classification was intended to further the legislative purpose." Id (citations omitted).
In this case, this Court should reverse Candedo's nine-year probationary period
because it is not rationally related to the legislatively-stated purpose of probation in Utah.
Additionally, Candedo's nine-year probationary period likely implicates a fundamental
right. Thus, this Court should apply a heightened degree of scrutiny. Under this
heightened degree of scrutiny, this Court should reverse because the nine-year
probationary period is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.

8

A.

< "andedo"'s 1NIIIU-\ ear Probationary Period h N111 Ualionalh Kclalcd to nln
Legislatively-Stated Purpose of Utah's Prohalion Statute.
I ;"i 01 i i its ii icepi ioi i h t! i.e "core of tl le probation movement in America" has been

"rehabilitation of offenders." Sharon M. Bunzel, The Probation Officer and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Strange Philosophical Bedfellows,
(

'' ' ^^ Roberts v. United States, *

M ~*~^

v. • -

M

H * ' "oldim. *hai ' b a ^

^urnose of probation" is "to provide an individualized program offering a young or
unhardened offender an opportunity to reii

I.:.MM;.-

;>• ..-

• '•'

'

i. United States v. Murray,
•'

• • ! - . • '

•-••

: a k c n

one wrong step, anu whom the judge thinks to be a branu V\'IM c.m he plucked from the
'MiHiiiiij ai me lime of the imposition of the sentence."); Sandra i.. Moser, AntiProstitution Zones: Justifications for Aouiiuoii.
("*()() 1) ("Probation is a manifestation of the pena; plulosoph) of rehabilitation."";.
Ilikewise. \hx lei:.i*-!a!i\el\-stated purpose of probation in I Itah is rehabilitation.
See I-lull L ode . iM.. s

-

> .-u.iui^ ;»;"o»x. <:

.

l

"act :)'f grace b)< 11
, i : eon n I si ispci iding tl :ie imposition or execution of a convicted
offender's sentence upon prescribed conditions." Id.; see State v. Spiers, 361 P.2d 509,
51

1 nTl,

i

'; •

• . id:i;L. uii.i reiitmi.ii.mo:; o; -he persoi i oi i pi ot: >atioi I is 1 1 le l i lost
; hainc v. Beckstead, 347 P.2d 554, 557, 559 (Utah 1959) (holding

tllat the "fundamental objce!i\ e of prohatioif is 'Tcfon-. and rehabilitation"); State v.
Bonza, 150 P.2d 970. ^ 2 * l :.-.i- f'.'--; > r.io.dmg "purpose oi u.e proi\mon siaiute ' is to
pi o v ide opporti it lity f

•'•, •

" *

•

9

• '

*

Male \. Parker. S"^

i(

'd K> H,

1049 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("The purposes of probation are 'reform and rehabilitation'
rather than punishment." (citations omitted)).
Rehabilitation is a legitimate governmental interest. See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974). It
improves probationers' lives and prospects; allows families to stay together; allows a
probationer to work to repay his debt to society; saves tax dollars; relieves congestion in
the jails and prisons; and makes society safer by catching offenders while they are young
or unhardencd and reversing their downward spiral before it is too late.
Utah's probation statute, however, is not rationally related to achieving this
interest. As interpreted by Wallace, the probation statute authorizes a trial court to
impose a probationary term of any length, or to impose probation without specifying any
end date at all. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i); Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at ^13.
But lengthy and/or endless probationary terms do not rationally further rehabilitation.
Rehabilitation, if it is achieved at all, will be achieved "within a relatively short
period of time." National Comm'n on Reform of Fed. Grim. Laws, Final Report, § 3105
comment at 282 (1971); United States v. Albano, 698 F.2d 144, 149 (2nd Cir. 1983) ("[I]l
is frequently thought that the rehabilitative purpose of probation can be accomplished, if
at all, within five years." (citations omitted)); State v. Oliver, 490 A.2d 242, 248 (Md.
1985) ("The experts in this area have generally argued that the rehabilitative purpose of
probation can be achieved, if at all, within five years.'" (citations omitted)); U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 2 Attorney General's Survey of Release Procedures, 313 (1939) ("[PJroper
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seleclioi i of pi obatioi i si ibjects presi ippose|s] 1 1 mt i efon nation • :>t i el labilil atioi i may be
achieved within a relatively short period, generally 2 years.").
Thus, probation should only last as long as necessary "'to deternnm \\iic;:.er
con I uience has been nu.-placed and lo i"fu Hie supen r o n i v i n n jtlequ lie nppmiiini!'
" active.'" American Bar Ass'n Project on Standards for Criminal Justice,
Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, § 2.3(b)(ii) (approved
w;..i:. J -.^ tiL o i X - .»mi.ieni.t:;

.

••

'••*' '

':•..-'

• -... Manda*u.

iwiaiing to sentencing Aucrnau\ t^ ami Procedures): see ! ; ruled States v. Lancer, 508
i;.2d 719, 739 (3rd ( ir N " ; u iunicr. I . disseniing) (concluding that 'Mlxe }'cars of
probation is adequate to determine wlivi.-.c. u^,aiiu...i

^ -icu-iiu sul'licu'iills adjusted

'o soeici\"" and imposing a longer term
of probation ""does not seem compatible w nn a polio, of affording the 'unfortunate
another opportunity by clemency'"" (quoting Korematsu v. United States, ^ i v i >
• •

• ' - ) ; Mate v. Angle, 3^ ;' N V\ ."M-I M. ^ ( l o w a i W l ) I "We hi \W\\ (statute

limiting probation to five years] reflects the attitude of correctional authorities that
rehabilitation will occi ir within five years or not at all." (citing J. Yeager & R, Carlson,
"v "'»

Criminal Law and Procedun

i ,-

General's Survey of Release Procedures 315 (1939) (noting that "ftjhere is no
justification for continuing probationary oversight beyond 5 years").
11 probai:**,, ;w .;, ,;~;. ^ .

. .

."•.

aes the rehabilitative uoals n r probation, adds to the
overcrowding of prisons and jails, and dilnies AP&P's already meager resources.
11

\uon ie>

First, long probationary periods undermine the rehabilitative goals of probation by
reinforcing the probationer's belief that he is an outsider whom society distrusts and is
determined to see fail. Cf. ABA, Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and
Procedures, § 2.3(b)(ii) at 64 & Commentary at 70 (noting open-ended probation
"impcde[s| rehabilitation by failing to provide the offender with a terminal point towards
which he can work"). As explained by this Court:
Probation programs are postulated upon an awareness that one
who has been convicted of a crime in all likelihood had some social
maladjustment and often a feeling that he is picked on or abused by
society. Essential to the correction of these things and the bringing
about of a well-disposed attitude toward society and its laws is the
allaying of any existing feelings of inferiority or resentment. These
considerations make it particularly important that his situation of
limited liberty not be used as a basis to take advantage of or impose
upon him. They rather argue the advisability of being careful, not
only to treat him fairly, but in such a manner that he will see the
fairness of it.
Bame, 347 P.2d at 559.
Probation severely limits a person's freedom, encroaches on his constitutional
rights, and constantly threatens him with incarceration. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 7718-1; Samson V.California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) ("probationers 'do not enjoy "the
absolute liberty"' of other citizens (citations omitted)); United States v. Nachtigal, 507
U.S. 1, 5 (1993) (per curiam) ("liberty infringement [is] caused by a term of probation");
Blanton v. City of North Las Veaas, Nev., 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989) ("probation . . . may
engender 'a significant infringement of personal freedom'" (citation omitted)); State ex
rcl. A.C.C., 2002 UT 22, ^24, 44 P.3d 708 ("c[I]nherent in the very nature of probation is
that probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled/"
12

( :ita1 io! i on lil ted)); Smith v. Cook, 8u.^ »' ".J /88, 7v

• .an i ^ Q ) ("' Hie general nature

of probation places significant restrictions on tlic liberty of the person placed on
probation" (citation omitted)); State v. Cowdell, 626 P.2d 48 ; , ^ 189 (I Jtal :i 1981)
11 ii i ilitilioiit i •! h;i\ t | ii i nil {| pt i n i. din ,i I 11" In I - !im I ; r n si 11"11. 11

.' •'

personal

liberty"); R. 246.
Extending probation beyond the time that its burdensome requirements and
limitation^ .;.><. necessary to compel O'iripli.iri e

in "Ihu '.VMMI1, "snbjri (|in(e| llie

offender to a pointlessly extended jeopardy," Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal
Procedure, § 26.9(a), at 862 (2007) (citation omitted) (hereinafter LaFave, Criminal
Procedure)—threatens In w
defenr •••••

..-..,

i

^.

• << , LO iuci nke an outsider even when he ib living by society's rules. See

Baine, 347 P.2d at 559. If a defendant cannot "see the fairness" in his probationary
period, then l.«s . ..^ im*^ of inferiority or resentment" mav rei,
newly act •>-. J» -^ . • • •

•,

. •

;

.ind il\ laws" and driving hii n to return lo his

previous lifestyle. Id.
Second, long probationary periods add to the overcrowding of prisons ai id jails,
As explained k)bu\ e. piobalioin iMirii", m;m\ luinlensnnn in|iiireinents. See Utah Code
Ann. § 77-18-1(8); R. 246. Regardless of rehabilitation, the longer a defendant is on
probation, the more likely it is that he will violate a probationary requirement, Even if a
d c fc n d a i 11 i s f: i 111 y i c : 1 i a 1: >i 1 i 1 a I c d 1 i e c o i 11 d s 1 111 ^ *>/ i it i d i i j: i i i < j a i 1 :.) I p r i s o i i 1 o i i i i a d v e i t e i 111 y
violating a term of his probation. This would undermine the defendant's rehabilitation by
making him feel he was treated unfairly, heaping upon him the stigma of incarceration,
13

and forcing him to associate with hardened criminals even though he lived in society
crime-free for several years. See Roberts, 320 U.S. at 272 (holding "purpose of
probation" is to offer "a young or unhardened offender an opportunity to rehabilitate
himself without institutional confinement. . ."); Baine, 347 P.2d at 559. Or, as explained
above, simple exhaustion from complying with probation's many burdensome
requirements for an unnecessary length of time could revive old "feelings of inferiority or
resentment," overwhelming his newly acquired respect for "society and its laws" and
driving him to return to his previous lifestyle. Baine, 347 P.2d at 559.
Third, long probationary periods aggravate AP&P's "caseload burden[s]" and
dilute its resources by increasing the length of time it must supervise each probationer.
LaFave, Criminal Procedure, § 26.9(a), at 862 (noting that statutes that do not limit the
length of probation may "'aggravate^ the caseload burden of the probation staff"
(quoting 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 18-2.3 commentary at 18-81 (2d ed.
1980)); see Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, 22 Crime & Just. 149, 157
(1997) ("In recent years, probation agencies have struggled—with continued meager
resources—to upgrade services and supervision.") (hereinafter Petersilia, Probation in the
United States). This too will harm rehabilitation. In a probation program, "[sjufficient
monetary resources are essential to obtaining and sustaining judicial support and
achieving program success." Id at 186-87 ("'Unenforced sanctions jeopardize any
sentence, undermining its credibility and potential to address serious sentencing concerns
. . . they are like sentences to prison with cell doors that do not lock and perimeter gates
that slip open/" (citation omitted)).
14

In fact, in I"1'}'.-!, nlm/n

Legisla;
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*•' * o

limit probation, it identified AP&P's overburdened caseload as a purpose of the
amendment. See S.B. 91, Day 20, Budget Sess. (Utah Jan. 28, 1984) (Rep. Nolan E.
Karras speaking). "'"I} V"|e have not bcci I able I o pro1 'idc, (c i ; d iat :ver reasoi i, < M: IOI igh
resources to | A PA1,1: |J" | u> be able to handle the case loads that they carry. Presently, the
Utah's case load is 50% highci \rA]l (he n-fional average. These bills, Senate Bill 91 and
Senate Bill S1)." restrict the ;.;;-: mai • ;Tenders are "i indn Mi|n;r\ ismn. ' Id
Recognizing tl lat loi ig probal ioi lary periods undermine rehabilitation, the federal
government and most states have enacted statutes that "set a uniform maximum such as
five years for felonies and one or two year*

{V

' s usdemeanors." I,al*avv. Criminal

Procedure, § 26.9(a) af H(P (< ilalnn .

" •

J

erpi etii ig these statutes, a few

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3561 (ex h v 1996) (authorizing probation of no "more than
five years" for felonies); Ala. Code § 15-22-54(a) (2008) (same); Alaska Stat. Ann. §
12.55.090(c) (2008) (prohibiting probation for felonies from exceeding "10 years"); Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-902(a) (2006) (authorizing probation up to seven years depending
on crime); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-29(d), (e), (g) (West 2008) (ordering probation
for felonies to be "not more than five years" and requiring trial court to review after two
years); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4333(b)(l)-(3) (2008) (limiting probation to "[t]wo
years, for any violent felony," "[ejighteen months" for specified offenses, and "[o]ne
year" for other offenses); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 948.04(1) (West 2004) (ordering probation
"not to exceed 2 years" for felonies "unless otherwise specified by the court"); Ga. Code
Ann. § 42-8-34.1(g) (2001) (ordering probation to be no "more than a total of two years
for any one offense or series of offenses arising out of the same transaction. . ."); Haw.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 706-623(1) (2006) (limiting probation to ten or five years, depending
on crime); 730 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/5-6-2(b) (West 2005) (limiting probation to four
years or 30 months, depending on crime); Iowa Code Ann. § 907.7(1) (West 2008)
(requiring probatioii "not 1o exceed five years" for felonies); Kan. Stat. \nr.. ': ^ •
4611(a) (2000) (same); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 533.020(4) (West 2002) (ordering
probation for felonies not to "exceed five (5) years, or the time necessary to complete
restitution, whichever is longer"); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 893 (2008) (ordering
that probation shall not be "more than five years"); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A,
15

jurisdictions have expressly noted that it "make[s] sense for" the legislating body to limit
the length of probation by statute because research shows "that the rehabilitative purpose
of probation can be accomplished, if at all, within five years." Albano, 698 F.2d at 149
(citations omitted); see Angle, 353 N.W.2d at 425 ("We believe [our probation statute]
reflects the attitude of correctional authorities that rehabilitation will occur within five
years or not at all." (citation omitted)); Oliver, 490 A.2d at 248 ("'The experts in this area
have generally argued that the rehabilitative purpose of probation can be achieved, if at
all, within five years'" (citations omitted)). The remainder, however, have simply "held
or assumed, usually with little or no discussion, that the statute limits the total period of
probation" to the time specified. Albano, 698 F.2d at 146 (citations omitted).
Some of these jurisdictions recognize additional purposes for probation—such as
protecting society or enforcing restitution—and expressly allow longer probationary

§1202(1) (2006) (authorizing probation "not to exceed 4 years" for class A crimes); Md.
Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 6-222(a)(3)(i) (West 2005) (prohibiting probation from
exceeding five years); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 771.2a(l) (West 2006) (same); Miss.
Code Ann. § 47-7-37 (2006) (same); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 559.016(1) (2005) (same); Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 29-2263(1) (2003) (same); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176A.500(1) (2007) (same);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651:2(V) (2007) (same); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:45-2(a) (2007)
(ordering probation "not to exceed the maximum term which could have been imposed or
more than 5 years whichever is lesser"); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20-5(A) (2003) (ordering
that probation for felony "shall not exceed five years"); N.Y. Penal Law § 65.00(3)(a)(i)
(McKinney 2006) (same); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-1342(a) (West 1995) (same); N.D.
Cen. Code Ann. § 12.1-32-06.1(1) (2007) (same); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2951.07 (West
2002) (same); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-440(6) (1992) (same); S.D. Cod. Laws §25-4A-6
(1994) (same); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.96.050 (2002) (requiring parole not to exceed
three years); W. Va. Code § 62-12-11 (West 1953) (prohibiting probation from exceeding
five years); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 973.09(2)(b) (West 2006) (requiring probation for felony
not to exceed three years); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-301(a) (West 2000) (authorizing
"probation for a term not to exceed five (5) years").
16
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See, e.g., A. : »•
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probation from exceeding "25 years for a felony sex offense"); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
13-902(a) (authorizing probation up to seven years for specified crimes); Haw. Rev Stat.
Ann. § 706-623(1) (ai ithorizing j : i obatioi i 1 lp to tci 1 yc ai s (01 specified ci ii 1 ics); Kai i Stat.
iViin. § 21-4611(a), (ex 7; f l o w i n g that probation iii "nonsupport of a child" cases "may
be continued as long as the responsibility for support continues"); Ky. Rev. Stat Arr §
533.020(4) (ordering probation for felonies not to "exceed \\\ .• . *;. v. JI necessary to ecu. i tplel e restiti ition, whicnuvur is longer"); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, §
1202(1-A)(A)(1) (2007) (allowing probation in felony cases to last up to eighteen years if
victim was a child).
Likewise

• '-• -:•

(

, .^M, IV -• U ior a few unique crimes,

special probationary purposes exist and require longer probationary periods. See, e.g.,
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406.5(2) (Supp. 2008) (allowing probation periods in certain
sexual offense „...:

;I cases "I«M n\ h>,i r u*i • iiiiiini M,l leu \ rars"^); State v.

Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, p o , 69 P.3d 1278 (purpose of probation allowed under section
76-5-406.5 "'is to avoid compounding the harm already suffered while protecting the
VL

..

:

•

).

Finally, "[a] few jurisdictions leave the matter entirely in the court's discretion or
permit probation to extend to the maximum sentence of confinement authorized by
statute." LaFave, Criminal Procedure, § 26.9(a), at 862.4 This , 1 lowevei is t he mil i :>rity

4

"f

See, e.g., Ida. Code Ann. § 19-2601(7) (2005) (authorizing probation for felonies
i period of not more than the maximum period for which the defendant might have
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approach and is regarded as "unwise." Id. "'Such open-ended authority not only may
subject the offender to a pointlessly extended jeopardy, but it aggravates the caseload
burden of the probation staff as well.'" Id. (quoting 3 ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice § 18-2.3 commentary at 18-81 (2d ed. 1980)). Thus, "[mjodern statutes make no
attempt to tie the term of probation to the often lengthy authorized term of

been imprisoned"); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-2(c) (West 2008) (same); Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 279 § 1 (West 1998) (authorizing probation "for such time" as the court "shall
fix"); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 137.545(1 )(a) (West 2005) (same); 42 Pa. Stat. Ann. §
9754(a) (West 2007) (authorizing probation that "may not exceed the maximum term for
which the defendant could be confined"); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §12-19-13 (1972) (same);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(c)(l) (2007) (same); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, § 205(a)(2)
(2008) (same).
Unlike the majority of jurisdictions, at least some of these jurisdictions recognize
purposes for probation beyond rehabilitation and apply these purposes generally, rather
than to certain specified crimes. See, e.g., State v. Mummert, 566 P.2d 1110, 1112
(Idaho 1977) ("The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an opportunity to be
rehabilitated under proper control and supervision."); Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 550
(Ind. 1999) (listing "avoiding incarceration" and "permitting the offender to meet the
offender's financial obligations" as purposes of probation); Commonwealth v. Wilcox,
841 N.E.2d 1240, 1245 (Mass. 2006) ("The purpose of probation rather than immediate
execution of a term of imprisonment 'in large part is to enable the [convicted] person to
get on his feet, to become law abiding and to lead a useful and upright life under the
fostering influence of the probation officer.'" (citation omitted) (alteration in original));
Commonwealth v. Sheridan, 743 N.E.2d 856, 859 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (listing
"'rehabilitation of the probationer and protection of the public'" as purposes of probation
(citations omitted)); State v. Martin, 580 P.2d 536, 539 (Or. 1978) ("The purposes of
probation include rehabilitation and the freedom of the individual, as long as these are
consistent with public safety.'" (citation omitted)); Commonwealth v. Hartman, 908 A.2d
316, 320 (Pa. Super. 2006) ("'A probation order is . . . designed to rehabilitate a criminal
defendant while still preserving the rights of law-abiding citizens to be secure in their
persons and property.'" (citation omitted)); State v. Campbell, 833 A.2d 1228, 1233 (R.I.
2003) ("Probation is intended to serve a rehabilitative function by allowing a defendant
the opportunity to show by his conduct that incarceration is no longer necessary."); State
v. Lockwood, 632 A.2d 655, 659 (Vt. 1993) ("Probation is intended to allow a defendant
an opportunity for rehabilitation at the same time it protects society." (citation omitted)).
18
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. ''"i- w .irs for felonies

and one or two years for misdemeanors." Id. (citations omitted); see supra at n.3.
Like the majority of other jurisdictions, it appears from A^ language of I Italy's
probation stall ite tl tat 01 it Lcgislati in c i a idci si ood tl ic: :i:: u lgers ofloi ig probatioi lary periods
ai id intended to limit tl ic length of probation that a trial court may impose. See I Jtal i
Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) (Supp. 2005). Utah's probation statute says: "Probation
may be terminated at any tit i le a1 tl ic disci el I ii i :>( tl lie coi irt or u p o n completion without
violation ol 36 nlonths probation in felony or class A m i s d e m e a n o r cases, or 12 m o n t h s
in eases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions." Id. (emphasis added).
The Legislature adopted, this language in 1989. See Ui
l(7)(a) (v-pp. ••'>*'

;

*.;

^ h»-e 1989, the probation statute said: "Upon completion without

violation ol^ 18 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or six months
in class B misdemeanor cases, the offender shall be terminated from sentence atid the
supeiA tsiuNt ul iln" I >i\ isiiun ul't 'omvlu HIP, unless the person is earlier terminated by the
court." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a) (Interim Supp 1984).
Despite the provision regarding 12 or 36 months, this Court determined ni Wallace
that the "cur •*

•

.•

lalion on tlle

length of probationary term that a court may impose." Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at fflfl 1, 13.
To reach this conclusion, this Court compared the current statute to its previous version.
id. at fj|l 1. Before 1989. tl ic pi obatioi i si ati il e ' ci cale ;:! a ! si re i ig i i lai idale

1: >y :)i dei ing

that "the probation period shall be terminated" upon successful completion of "18
months' probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases." Id.; see Utah Code Ann. §
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77-18-l(10)(a) (Interim Supp. 1984). In 1989, however, "the Legislature modified the
statute to its current form, substituting 'may' for 'shall.'" Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at ^11
(citation omitted); see Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(7)(a) (Supp. 1989).
As acknowledged by this Court, Wallace's interpretation of the statute makes "the
provision regarding 36 months . . . nearly meaningless, since the court may terminate
probation 'at any time.'" Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at ^13. This Court could not remedy this
"defect," however, "without inserting meaningful terms that simply are not there." Id
Although a drafting "defect" prevented this Court from giving meaning to "the
provision regarding 36 months," id., the Legislature's inclusion of this provision strongly
indicates that it intended to limit probation. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i); see
Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98,1J30, 104 P.3d 1208 (holding that when
"examining the plain language" of a statute or ordinance to discern its meaning, appellate
courts "must assume that each term included in the ordinance was used advisedly"
(citation omitted)); Versluis v. Guaranty Nat. Companies, 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992)
(noting that when construing a statute, this Court will "presume that the Legislature used
each term advisedly, and [will] give effect to each term according to its ordinary and
accepted meaning" (citation omitted)); Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge # 1743,
B.P.O.E., 854 P.2d 513, 518 n.21 (Utah) ("Whenever possible, statutes should be
construed so that no portion is superfluous."), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 869 (1993). This is
especially true, given that the Legislature included the limiting language without any
reference to "discretion of the court." See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i).
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The

CLS'.i!".1

.:

: . - aLIOII is further revealed by

legislative history. The Legislature adopted the pre-1989 version of the probation statute
in 1984 for the express purpose of :\:. :ung AK ivin^Ui *>i probation. See S.B. 91 Day 20,
Budget Si •

s, 1V84,

'••

•

•-. .

.oi live years later,

in 1989, the Legislature passed tlic currciit version of the statute without anv discussion,
thereby suggesting that the Legislature only intended to expand 11ic lent;::. *>i probation
permitted and iml lo revoke il , userarcliiiu \n\\n

(

in Inn

Ii> lnu»th ul piuhahuii

1989 Utah Laws 689-91, Ch. 226, §1, H.B. 314.
Thereafter, the Legislature did iiot amend the statute to remove the provision
regarding iz *?r *-t* ,\i---: '•; - ,^

\

ic coi u t of appeals, stai i ii ig in 1993, ii il erpi etcd

that pt ^*. »' as imputing a 12- or 30-month limitation on probation. See McDonald,
2005 UT App 86 at ^[19 (holding probation statute "limits probation for any particular
class C misdemeanor to twelve months" (citation omitted)), cert, denied, 124 I'.3d 251
(Utah 2005); Robinson, 860 r.zu y/y ai y&2 ^noting ••maximum formal probation
periods" for misdemeanors and felonies "are respectively twelve months and thirty-six
months" (citation omitted)), cert, denied, h M'.~d... s -i

< :..•

,v

/4).

Fmllu'i ii! nlhei sl.ilutr,. nui 1 egisliihire lias delinralrd probationary purposes
beyond rehabilitation for particular crimes and has legislatively-defined longer
probationary periods to accomplish those special purposes. See, e.g., Uuiii i/uUvj . ,n.i. §
76-5 • -IJ M . .

,

-,

•<

t

. * nses

"for up to a maximum often years"); Pritchett, 69 P.3d at 1285-86 (purpose of probation
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allowed under section 76-5-406.5 " ; is to avoid compounding the harm already suffered
while protecting the victim from further abuse'" (citation omitted)).
In this case, the trial court imposed 108 months (nine years) of probation. R. 246;
270:35. This probationary period is three times as long as the 36-month probationary
limit apparently contemplated by the Legislature, and far longer than necessary to
determine whether Candedo can be successfully rehabilitated. See Utah Code Ann. § 7718-1(10)(a)(i); National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Final Report,
§ 3105 comment at 282 (1971). Rather than conveying society's desire to see Candedo
successfully reintegrated into society, such a lengthy probationary period conveys
society's distrust of Candedo and its desire to see him fail. This undermines the
rehabilitative purposes of probation because it feeds "any existing feelings of inferiority
or resentment" rather than "bringing about [] a well-disposed attitude toward society and
its laws." Bame, 347 P.2d at 559.
The trial court said that it was imposing a nine-year probationary term "because of
the amount o f restitution that Candedo had "to pay back." R. 270:35. Restitution,
however, is not a legislatively-stated goal of probation in Utah. See Utah Code Ann. §
77-27-1 (10).5 Although the trial court may order the defendant to pay restitution as a

3

A few jurisdictions recognize enforcing restitution as a purpose of probation, but
these jurisdictions, particularly those that intend to expand the allowable probationary
period for purposes of enforcing restitution, clearly express this intent in their statutes and
carefully define the expansion permitted. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-902(c)
(2006) (allowing court to extend probation "not more than five years" if "court has
required, as a condition of probation, that the defendant make restitution . . . and that
condition has not been satisfied"); Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 6-222(b)(l)(i) (West
2005) (allowing court to extend probation for "an additional 5 years" "[f|or the purpose
22

condition of pi obatioi i, tl ic Code expressly for bids tl ic 1 1 ial cc in 1 froi n exl ei idii ig tl ic
probationary period in order to enforce restitution. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-18l(8)(a)(ix), 77-18-1(10)(a)(ii)(A), 77~38a-501(2)(b).
' v I rile oi i pi obal ic I i at id as a coi iditi :)i i of pi c 1: •< tl i :: -\ i , ' ' a 1 I ial coi u t I t lay order a
defendant to "make restitution or reparatioii to tlic victii11 or victims." Utah Code Ann. §
77-18-1 (8)(a)(ix). The phrase "[w]hile on probation" gives trial courts authority to make
restitution a condition of probation while ;i^ LI^U.M.- . .

:

.•••:'.. Id.; see State v.

Dickey, 8< ( 1 P 2d 1203, 1205-09 (Utah U . /vpp. i^92j. Bui it does not give trial courts
the broader authority to extend a probationary period until restitution is paid. See Smith,
803 P.2d at 7C-1

, ;K. trial court's power to grant, modify, or revoke probation is purely

statutory,

•

*• •

i nil 1 las discrel ioi i in 1 1 lese I i lattei s. tl :ie coi n t's discretion

must be exercised within the limits imposed by the legislature.").
"If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection
(lOYaYiV .-, ,

ns"resti*

•

-

i

jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation for the limited
purpose of enforcing the payment of [restitution]." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18vA); see icLal

%

•

ose

sanctions against the defendant" if he "defaults in tl payment of a judgment for
restitution or any installment ordered." Id at § 77-38a-501(l) (2003). But, the "court

of making restitution"); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 533.020(4) (West 2002) (prohibiting
probation for felonies from exceeding five years "or the time necessary to complete
restitution, whichever is longer").
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may not impose a sanction" if "the sanction would extend the defendant's term of
probation or parole." Id at § 77-38a-501(2)(b).
The Legislature's decision to exclude restitution as a goal of probation makes
sense because the purposes of probation and restitution are naturally at odds. The
purpose of probation in Utah is rehabilitation. Slee Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1(10). It is a
discretionary order generally reserved for "young or unhardened offenders]." Roberts,
320 U.S. at 272; see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(2)(c)-(d) (Supp. 2008) (saying trial
court "may sentence" a defendant "to probation" or "to imprisonment"); Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18-l(2)(a) (saying trial court "may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution
of the sentence and place the defendant on probation").
While restitution may also have rehabilitative qualities, rehabilitation is not the
main goal of restitution. Dickey, 841 P.2d at 1209; see Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a302(5)(c)(iii) (Supp. 2008) (listing "rehabilitative effect on the defendant" as one
consideration for "determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered
restitution"). Rather, the main goal of restitution is "repay [ing] victims." Dickey, 841
P.2d at 1209 (citations omitted).
As explained above, achieving rehabilitation (whether directly, through probation,
or indirectly, through restitution) will take "a relatively short period of time." National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Final Report, § 3105 comment at 282
(1971). Research shows it "can be accomplished, if at all, within five years." Albano,
698 F.2d at 149 (citations omitted). Whereas, repaying victims may take many years.
See, e.g., R. 270:34-35. Thus, extending probation until restitution is complete would
24

"pointlessly extend jcopiinh" hv\ mnl (In hum (he of tenth i i-, i Jhilulifated, LaFave,
Criminal Procedure, § 26.9(a), at 862; aggravate AP&P's "caseload burdens" by
increasing the length of time individuals must be supervised, id,; and threaten to urn:o the
1 el labilil atioi i ah eady acl lie ^cd 1: } f I i lakii lg 1 1 le defet idai it feel like ai i oi itsidci even when
he is living by society's rules. See Baine, 347 P.2d at 559.
The better approach is the approach apparently contemplated by our Legislature:
nnrize a probal ic i lai y pei iod 1 1 lat is Hi i lil cd I o 1 1 le 1 ii \ ic i lecessai y foi I el labilil at ion,
but allow the trial court to continue the defendant on bench probation after probation is
complete in order to enforce the restiti!':.:!> ..:J^ See Utah Code Ann. §§77-18l(8)(a)(ix), 7 7 - i -

• -^VaViiV ...

, . ^ .-

.

{

,: h.

. on ^uiLuiu, as interpreted by Wallace, violates due process
because it does not rationally further the Legislature's stated legitimate interest in
rehabilitation- . > ;K contrary i* actually undermines probation's rehar ;iau\ e LUU^ ny
makin

:

i-i'-. '

• \,i^w

i iivii:<: ;\\ socict) "s rules, adding

to the overcrowding of prisons and jails, and diluting AP&P's already meager resources.
Thus, this Court should reverse and remand for resentencing because the Iliile-year
"'»' i »lt<il ion.11; , lei

ordered, tn < J m led n \ e,iM* e\eeed J i n I! mil , i il \ uip.l ilulh dialily.

Ihis Court Should Reverse Because Candedo's Nine-Year Probationary
Period Implicates a Fundamental Liberty Interest and Is Not Narrowly
Tailored to Serve a Compelling State Interest
"The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the 'liberty' it
protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint
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v

Washington v.

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) (citation omitted). 'The Clause also provides
heightened protections against government interference with certain fundamental rights
and liberty interests." IdL at 720 (citations omitted).
In order to establish whether a liberty interest is fundamental, the United States
Supreme Court has outlined an analysis with "two primary features." Id. at 720-21.
First, the Supreme Court has "required in substantive-due-process cases a 'careful
description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest." Id. at 721 (citations omitted).
Second, it has "regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition,' and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.'" Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21
(internal and end citations omitted). "Our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices
thus provide the crucial 'guideposts for responsible decisionmaking,' that direct and
restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 721 (internal citation omitted).
Utah's probation statute, as interpreted by Wallace, allows trial courts to impose
probation for as long as they like, even for the rest of a probationer's life. See Utah Code
Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i); Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at «||13. This is true of all criminal
offenses, even infractions. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i). Thus, a "'careful
description' of the asserted fundamental liberty interest" before this Court is "whether the
'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes" the right of a person
who has been selected as a young or unhardened offender likely to succeed on probation
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to regain 1 lis libci ty 01 ice 1 1 ic pi n poses oi pi obation ai e coi t lplete. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
at 720-21, 723.
In Utali, the legislatively-stated purpose of probation is rehabilitation. Probation
achieves i\.um\:. ... •..
iiilplics, to prove 1limself." Baine, 347 P.2d at 557. "For this purpose the defendant is
required to agree to specified standards of conduct; and his continued liberty is dependent
upon compliance with them.'' Id. Likewise, uthe freedoi i i 1 ic enjoys is Hi i lited ai id is
sub;

. v - ; :

:.

••'.; ,.! . -Miuiib. id.

- •

In other words, in order to achieve rehabilitation, probation is expressly designed
to limit a defendant's freedom by compelling hinI to comply with specific standards of
CO

*

'

' I i l ^ L\l..!

ML"

first, fourth, and fifth amendments of the United States Constitution), and constantly
threatening him with incarceration. See I Jtah Code Ann. § 77-18-1; Samson, 547 I J.S. at
848 ("'"pi obatioi iei s 'dc l lot ei ljoy """"1 1 ic absoh ite libci i; '* " of otl ICI citizens" (cv:
omitted)); Nachtigal, 507 U.S. at 5 ("liberty iilfringement [is] caused by a term of
probation''); Blanton, 489 U.S. at 542 ("probatioii
infrinpomcnt of personal freedom'" (citation

may engender ' a significant
- ;); United States v. Heath.

\

1312, 1316 n.2 (11 th Cir. 2005) (explaining that probation subjects defendants to certain
'"limitations to which ordinary citizens are f r e e ' " because they ' " h a v e been convicted of
crimes and have thereby given the state a compelling interest in limit;! ;

x

x-} • -

ordei 1 o effcel \ late tl leii i cl labilital ioi I ai id t ;.) protect society.'" (citation omitted));
A.C.C., 2002 UT 22 at 1|24 (c"[I]nherent in the very nature of probation is that
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probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled."5
(citation omitted)); Smith, 803 P.2d at 793 ("The general nature of probation places
significant restrictions on the liberty of the person placed on probation" (citation
omitted)); Cowdell 626 P.2d at 489 (probationers have "limited procedural rights" and a
"restricted . . . right to personal liberty"); R. 246.
A defendant does not have a right to be put on probation. See Utah Code Ann. §
76-3-201(2) (saying trial court "may sentence" a defendant "to probation" or "to
imprisonment"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(2)(a) (saying trial court "may, after imposing
sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation");
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1(10) (defining probation as an "act of grace by the court
suspending the imposition or execution of a convicted offender's sentence upon
prescribed conditions"); State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 730 (Utah 1980) ("Probation
is a discretionary matter with the trial judge." (citations omitted)); State v. Sibert, 310
P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1957) (same). Rather, probation is generally reserved for the "young
or unhardened offender" who is likely to benefit from "an opportunity to rehabilitate
himself without institutional confinement under the tutelage of a probation official and
under the continuing power of the court to impose institutional punishment for his
original offense in the event that he abuse this opportunity." Roberts, 320 U.S. at 272.
But if a defendant is selected as one of the "young or unhardened offenders]"
likely to be rehabilitated and is placed on probation, then he has a fundamental interest in
regaining his liberty once the purposes of probation are complete. IcL Accordingly, the
State may not continue to limit his constitutional rights and impose burdensome standards
28

of con* I iic I bevoinl llu linn tlt.il i h r i r lihrrly restrict «'•!• •• :•

"IUII

i o\\ l\ tailored to serve a

compelling state interest."' Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (citation omitted).
Rehabilitation, Utah's legislatively-stated purpose o f probation, .
coi i ipellii ig state ii i1 eresl

.^cy a

See United States v. Cothran, 8 : ^ • '" " l y , / 3 i \'

1988). Thus, so long as the length of a probationary period is ""narrowly tailored to
serve 5 " the Legislature's stated interest in rehabilitation, it is permissible. Glucksberg,
521 1 1.S. ail; 721 (cil atic i i oi :t litl c :1) i : v..s explaii icd it l sect i :: \ i. I ' ' \ „ i el labilitatioi i, if ii is
achieved at all, will be achieved "within a relatively short period o f time." National
Commission on Reform o f Federal Criminal Laws, Final Report, § 3105 c o m m e n t at 2 8 2
(1971). Research s h o w s fh •

'h: "

...

accomplished, if at all, within five years." Albano, 6 9 8 F.2d at 149 (citations omitted);
see Oliver, 4 9 0 A.2d at 2 4 8 (same); Angle, 353 N . W . 2 d at 425 (same); Lancer, 5 0 8 F.2d
at 739 (Hunter, J., dissenting) (same):

v

of Release Procedures, n^^\

; vp
• •

. ustice, 2 Attorney General's Survey
-:

*

..- >. .thieved within a

relatively short period, generally 2 years," and "[tjhere is no justification for continuing
probationary oversight beyond 5 years").
Ill pi obati :»! I lasts bey or id tl lis t ii I IC, ill I n id< ;TI i lii ics ii s i el n ibilitat ive go« lis by n lakii ig
the probationer continue to feel like an outsider even when he is living by society's rules,
thereby resurrecting his "feelings o f inferiority or resentment'" ti:;u UY>\ :,:L. i.«m to retiim
iJaine, j-i

• -

f

prisons and jails, and dilutes A P & P ' s already meager resources. See LaFave, Criminal
Procedure, § 26.9(a), at 862 (noting statutes that do not limit t h e length o f probation may
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'"aggravate^ the caseload burden of the probation staff" (citation omitted)); Petersilia,
Probation in the United States, at 157 ("In recent years, probation agencies have
struggled—with continued meager resources—to upgrade services and supervision.").
Recognizing that long probationary periods are counterproductive to rehabilitation,
the federal government and most states have enacted statutes that "set a uniform
maximum such as five years for felonies and one or two years for misdemeanors."
LaFave, Criminal Procedure, § 26.9(a), at 862 (citation omitted); see supra at n.3. Some
of these jurisdictions allow probationary periods longer than five years, but these periods
are generally reserved for particular crimes and carry a legislatively-stated purpose
beyond rehabilitation. See supra at Part I.A. Likewise, our Legislature has identified a
few specific crimes that necessitate probationary purposes beyond rehabilitation and has
statutorily-defined a longer probationary period in order to achieve those special
purposes. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406.5(2); Pritchett, 2003 UT 24 at <p0.
Accordingly, in Utah, except for a few specifically identified crimes, probation
that lasts beyond the period necessary to achieve rehabilitation—approximately five
years—violates due process because it is not "'narrowly tailored to serve'" the
Legislature's interest in rehabilitation. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (citation omitted).
As explained in section I.A., the trial court imposed 108 months (nine years) of
probation in this case. R. 246; 270:35. This probationary period is three times as long as
the 36-month probationary limit apparently contemplated by the Legislature, four years
longer than the five-year time period identified by research as beneficial to rehabilitation
and followed by the federal government and most states, and far longer than necessary to
30

determii ic A/1 ic! 1 lei Candedo can be successf

•••• 's ] ' • :;. ^ c c Utah Loci-.- \ • • s 77-

18-l(10)(a)(i); National Commissioi1 on Reform of Federal Criminal L a w s , Final Report,
§ 3 1 0 5 comment at 282 (1971); supra at n . 3 .
'.I hus, tl lis ( Tri n 1 si 101 ild appb f a I icigl itened degree ol sci i il ii ly becai tse ( "ai idedo's
nine-year probationary period iinplicates 1lis fundamental liberty interest in regaining his
freedom once the purposes of probation are fulfilled. Further, this Court should reverse
because Candedo's nine-year probations- . . •

:-••,.

coi I ipelling si i:>. " • • ;Vi.
IL

I HE C O U R T OF APPEALS ERRED W H E N IT H E L D T H A T
C A N D E D O ' S DUE PROCESS A R G U M E N T C O U L D N O T B E
RAISED U N D E R RULE 22(c)

II' ill V.lc ) nil I IK Mt ili I' iili". nM 'I iniinnl Prui i dure says "|'t |he court may correct
an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time.'' I Jtah R.
Crim. P. 22(e). ' T h e purpose of rule 22(e) is to allow correction of manifestly illegal
sentences." State v. Telford, 2002 I ) 1 51,1]5, ! 8 I \3< 1 228 (fi x )ti ic >le < )i i litl ed). : ' A s si id i,
rule 22(e) claims are not restricted by time limits for bringing notice of appeal. Nor are
they waived by failure to raise them at the first opportunity before the district court/' IdL
'"This makes theoretical sei ise becai isc ai i illegal sci itci ice is void ai i :i , lil ;:e issi ics of
jurisdiction, [may be raised] at any time.'" Id. (citation omitted) (alteration in original).
Relying on language in Wallace, the court of appeals declined to use rule 22(e) to
reach Candedo's due process argument. See Candedo, 2008 I IT • : \ pp < \ at ^|6 Ii i Wallace,
this L,oui

"twelve-year probatioii does not constitute an illegal sentence."

Wallace, 2006 U T 86 at ^16. Citing this language, the court of appeals concluded that if
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the twelve-year probation in Wallace was not an illegal sentence, then "Candedo's nineyear probation is not an illegal sentence." Candedo, 2008 UT App 4 at *\}6.
The court of appeal's reliance on Wallace, however, was misplaced. In Wallace,
this Court granted a writ of certiorari to decide whether the language of the probation
statute "creates a thirty-six-month limitation for a term of probation as to any felony
conviction." Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at *(|4. The defendant did not argue and this Court did
not decide the follow-up question—whether the probation statute, as interpreted by
Wallace, is constitutional. Id. Thus, this Court's holding in Wallace does not decide the
issue in this case—whether Candedo's sentence is illegal or was imposed in an illegal
manner because the range authorized by the probation statute is unconstitutional.
In further justification of its decision not to reach Candedo's due process issue, the
court of appeals asserted that rule 22(e) only applies "where either 'the sentencing court
has no jurisdiction, or . . . the sentence is beyond the authorized statutory range.'"
Candedo, 2008 UT App 4 at 1|6 (quoting State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, TJ5 n.l, 48 P.3d
228). This narrow reading of rule 22(e) is contrary to this Court's case law.
In Telford, this court did not limit rule 22(e) to the two circumstances identified by
the court of appeals. See Telford, 2002 UT 51 at ^5 n. 1. Rather, it presented those two
circumstances as examples of illegal sentences. Id. When this Court said that "rule 22(e)
claims must be narrowly circumscribed to prevent abuse," it referred to the circumstance
where a defendant invokes rule 22(e) to challenge the underlying conviction rather than
the sentence. Id at ^[5 (citing State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,ffi[3-4,40 P.3d 630 (declining
to reach denial of rule 22(e) motion because defendant "attacks his guilty plea" rather
32

tl lai i *"ic: ci isii. ig c i i 1 1 ic dci lial of his n ilc 22(c) i nol ioi f )). Becai ise 1 .1 lat cii ci in isl ai ice is so
common, this Court has had to make clear that rule 22(e) is not a vehicle for raising
unpreserved challenges to the underlying conviction. See, e.g., State v. Nicholls, 2006
UT76,1|5, I-

.-

• :.

• ••••'

' •— •.

f

the appeal is . . . a challenge, not to the sentence itself, but to the underlying conviction"
(alteration 'w original) (citations omitted)); Telford, 2002 UT 51 at ^ 6 - 7 (same); Reyes,
2002 U'i

i,V-3, 5 (sai i ic); State v. Finlayson, 200*

..•-"'•

(same); State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995) (same).
When the defendant is challenging his sentence aiid not tlic underlying conviction,
however, the language of rule 22(e) is "sweeping." Brooks, 9i^ > ._.. \

l

\

1

I: las i ioi listed "all types of errors that i nay qualify for review under rule 22(e)." State v.
Samora, 2004 UT 79, ^{13, 99 P.3d 858. -,.i\ ii has determined that rule 22(e) is broad
enough to encompass constitutional \ iv>lalions, as in this case, as well as violations of
i i lies ai id si all ites. See, e.g., Samora, . : '

-

?

-

• ; "sei il ei ice in lposed ii \

violation of rule 22(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure may be considered a
'sentence imposed in an illegal manner' under rule 22(e)" (citation omitted)); State v.
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, psi

nl996)i

'

le

22(e) because statute did uilot authorize a consecutive, determinate two-year term");
Kuehnert v. Turner, 499 P.2d 839-41 (Utah 1975) (concluding sentence was illegal
because del ei idai it did i ioi 1 1a1 > e coi n isel, w< is i iot ii ii c i I i led oil Si; ciLl i <• \ I i ici ldmei it I igl il s
during sentencing, and had not knowinH\ and intelligently waived those rights).
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In particular, this Court has held that rule 22(e) is broad enough to encompass
sentences that violate due process, as Candedo argues in this case. See Telford, 2002 UT
51 at TflJ2-4. In Telford, this Court invoked rule 22(e) to reach the defendant's argument
that indeterminate sentencing violates Utah's due process clause. Telford, 2002 UT 51 at
l l

|[ |f2-4 (also using rule 22(e) to reach defendant's argument that indeterminate sentencing

violates both state and federal cruel and unusual punishment provisions).
Indeed, in cases other than Candedo's, the court of appeals itself has recognized
this Court's ruling that rule 22(e) encompasses constitutional violations. See, e.g., State
v. Garner, 2008 UT App 32,1fifl8-l9, 177 P.3d 637. In Garner, issued shortly after its
decision in Candedo, the court of appeals used rule 22(e) to reach the defendant's "attack
on the constitutionality of his sentence, and Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme in
general." IdL at Tf20; see also State v. Headley, 2002 UT App 58, 2002 WL 287890, at * 1
(memorandum decision) ("Utah law has no comprehensive definition of sentences
'imposed in an illegal manner'; however, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that a
sentence is imposed in an illegal manner when a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth
Amendment right to counsel during sentencing." (citation and footnote omitted) (attached
at Addendum F)).
In sum, the court of appeals erred by holding Candedo's due process claim was
"not reviewable under rule 22(e)." See Candedo, 2008 UT App 4 at ^[6. This decision
was contrary to the "sweeping" language of rule 22(e), as interpreted by this Court.
Brooks, 908 P.2d at 860; see Samora, 2004 UT 79 at V3; Telford, 2002 UT 51 at ffi[2-4;
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 551; Kuehnert, 499 P.2d at 839-41. And it was inconsistent
34

n\ 1 i il • ;n n i case \w v. See Garner, 2008 1 f I Vp) >• 32 ; it ^ | 1 8 - 2 0 ; IIcadley, 2(H)" -V L
287890, at * 1. 11ms, this Court should reverse the court of appeals' decision aiid use rule
22(e) to address Candedo's due process claim on the merits.
ill I

' I 'HE CUUK1 Ub APPEALS ERRED WHEN 1 1 H L L D l h / v i
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT JUSTIFY
REACHING CANDEDO'S DUE PROCESS ARGUMENT

The exceptional circiimstances doctrine applies "where [an appellate coiirt's]
failure to coi isidei ai i issi ie tl i< it was i lot pi o{ )ei ly preserved foi aj )peal" * /ill i csi ill "ii I
manifest injustice." State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ^j23, 94 P.3d 186. This
Court regards the exceptional circumstances doctrine as a '"safety device'" that protects
against su*./. injustice. I d , (citatioi is oi i litted). ()i ie ai ea \ vl lei e tl lis Coi n 1 applies tl ie
exceptioilal circumstances doctrine is in cases involving "rare procedural anomalies."
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n.3 (Utah 1993).
For example, in State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (\ -.• •" • . : :r.s Court "ei I lployed
the 'exceptloiiid i nvinn^tamvs' ruhrie where a t :.;uiy,e in iaw ui me settled interpretation
of law colored the failure to have raised an issue at trial." State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 10
(Utah Ct App. 1996) (quoting Lopez, 87 - r .:u .-.* I • -.• sp,,\ .^,\\\\

hat case. "[t]he

5
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. •

had been stopped on a pretext." IcL (citing Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1129). T h e State appealed
and w h e n the case reached this Court, "defendant argued for the first
.I)1 i l l I I ui'I (lit pie 11. \( »lii|i d» ii Inn 1 I" lit i'" >lnl m pi r\
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thai
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even if it 1leld the FourtlI A m e n d m e n t did not require such a doctrine." IcL (citing Lopez,
873 P.2d at 1134 n.2). This Court "found exceptional circumstances existed and
35

addressed the state constitutional issue because, at the time of the suppression hearing,
the pretext doctrine cwas the controlling rule of Fourth Amendment law as interpreted by
the court of appeals.'" Id. (citing Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1134 n.2).
Similarly, in State v. Hasten, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993) (per curiam), rev'g State
v. Hasten, 811 P.2d 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), "defendant challenged his conviction for
attempted second degree murder because the jury was allowed to consider depraved
indifference as a culpable state of mind for that offense." Irwin, 924 P.2d at 10 (citing
Hasten, 846 P.2d at 1277). "Defendant had not raised that issue at trial." Id, (citing
Hasten, 846 P.2d at 1277). But, in a case decided after defendant's trial, this Court "held
that Utah does not recognize the crime of attempted depraved indifference homicide." Id.
(citation omitted). Although defendant did not properly raise the issue below, this Court
utilized the exceptional circumstances doctrine to reach defendant's claim because it
"determined that it would be 'manifestly unjust' to leave him incarcerated for something
that is not recognized as a crime in Utah." Id. (quoting Hasten, 846 P.2d at 1277)
(internal footnote omitted).
In this case, the court of appeals declined to invoke the exceptional circumstances
doctrine to review Candedo's substantive due process claim. See Candedo, 2008 UT
App 4 at ffif7-9. It concluded that exceptional circumstances did not exist because
"Candedo was always free to assert" his due process claim before the trial court.
Candedo, 2008 UT App 4 at ^|8. Further, it concluded that Candedo "should have"
anticipated "that his due process rights were arguably implicated" when "the trial court
imposed such a long period of probation." Id
36

. ,i i l l j C e s require
review in this case. On September 12, 2005, the day Candedo was sentenced, Utah case
law interpreted the probation statute as imposing a 36-month liiilit on probation. See
McDonald, 2005 UI

,

'

•

rtcen an< ,,., • •

probation order exceeded its statutory authority, which limits probation for any particular
class C misdemeanor to twelve months"); Robinson, 860 P.2d at 982 (noting "maximum
foil was not uiill 1 after Candedo appealed his case that this Court issued Wallace.
See Wallace, 2006 UT 86 (issued Dec. 19, 2006). In Wallace, this Court overruled
McDonald and Robinson ai:*.
statutory

.; • . -. •

..•,."

»

Nation on tlic lungln of probation a uiai court ma} impose." Wallace, 2006

UT86ar„
Accordingly, at the tin^ he was sentenced, i aiuk .K I;.-... no warning in.:; "le
neede-

• : ."..

• *•

• •:

•

• ocess because, as

interpreted by Utah law, it did ilot. See id. He could not be expected lo predict that this
Court would issue a decision that overruled settled case law ..iu. reinterpreted tlle
:

•

'

*'

UJ. W'atkiss & Saperstein v.

Williams, 931 P.2d 840, 846 (Utah 1996) (noting, as part of ineffective assistance of
counsel discussion, that attorneys '"need not be clairvoyant and foresee future changes in
1111" I a w " ' ( c 11' 11 i ' ii i i

11 i 1111 It i i I i li
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iniplications this Court's future decision would raise and to present those implications to
the trial court. Id
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This is especially true given that at the time Candedo was sentenced, McDonald
and Robinson appeared to be settled case law. The provision regarding 36 months had
been in the probation statute since 1989. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(7)(a) (Supp.
1989). The court of appeals interpretation of that provision had been published and
followed since 1993. See McDonald, 2005 UT App 86 at If 19; Robinson, 860 P.2d at
982. In all that time, the Legislature had not amended the provision. See Utah Code
Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) (Supp. 2008). Nor had this Court corrected the court of appeals'
erroneous interpretation, despite opportunities to do so. See State v. McDonald, 124 P.3d
251 (Utah 2005) (denying a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals'
decision in McDonald); State v. Robinson, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994) (denying a
petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision in Robinson).
After Wallace, it appears that the court of appeals' interpretation of the probation
statute was not based on an in-depth analysis. Compare Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at ffi|13-14;
with McDonald, 2005 UT App 86 at ^[19; Robinson, 860 P.2d at 982. But many courts
across the country have similarly "held or assumed, . . . with little or no discussion, that
the statute limits the total period of probation" to the time specified. Albano, 698 F.2d at
146 (citations omitted). And few, if any, of those statutes have later been reinterpreted to
"provide[] no statutory limitation on the length of probation a trial court may impose."
Wallace, 2006 UT 86 at }\ 14; see Albano, 698 F.2d at 146.
The trial court sentenced Candedo to a 108-month probationary term. R. 246;
270:35. As was appropriate under the statutory interpretation of the time, Candedo
questioned the trial court's "power" to impose such a lengthy probationary term. R.
38

270:35, Bi it lie did not argue—and ii ideed 1 lad i 10 reasoi 1 to argue

tl lat tl le stati ite itsell

violalcd substantive due process because, as interpreted by settled case law, it did not.
See McDonald, 2005 UT App 86 at 1119; Robinson, 860 P.2d at 982.
Thus, this Court si 101 ild reverse tl le court of appeals' conclusioi I tl lal tl le
ex< /•

•

'

'•

.!i * :- « auow it to "address Candedo's substantive

due process argument." Candedo, 2008 UT App 4 at \\ ("• li --hi -ukl then reach the merits
of Candedo's substantive due process argument.

CONC1 ;USI()N
Candedo respectfully asks this Court to reverse and remand for resentencing
because his sei itei ice to set ve a i ni ie- yeai pi: obatioi lai: y pei iod violates di le process.
Candedo asks this Court to reach the merits of his argument through either rule 22(e) of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure or the exceptional circumstances doctrine.
SI IBM I I 1. ED this ^ > day of August, 2008.

LORIJTSEPPI
Attorncv forD»-*. •: . .
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, LORI J. SEPPI, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered an original and
nine copies of the foregoing to the Utah Supreme Court, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells
Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 841140854, this

ffi

day of August, 2008.

LORI

DELIVERED this t ^

Aft^

day of August, 2008.
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McHUGH, Judge:
^[l
Francisco A. Candedo appeals his conviction for one count
each of Securities Fraud, a second degree felony, see Utah Code
Ann. §§ 61-1-1, -21 (2006) , and Sales by an Unlicensed Agent and
Employing an Unlicensed Agent, both third degree felonies, see
id. §§ 61-1- 3, -21 (2006) .3 Candedo argues that this court
should reverse because either (1) the trial court may not impose
consecutive terms of probation under the Utah Code of Criminal
Procedure, see Utah Code Ann, § 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) (Supp. 2 0 0 7 ) ,
or (2) section 77-18-] (] 0) (a) (
:
i ), as interpreted, by State v.

1. Candedo was charged under the current version of the statute.
The Utah Legislature last amended the applicable sections in
19 83, see Utah Uniform Securities Act Amendment, ch. 2 84, sec. 4,
§ 61-1-1, 1983 Utah Laws 1108, 1114 (codified as amended at Utah
Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (2006)); 1997, see Uniform Securities Act
Amendments, ch. 160, sec. 1, § 61-1-3, 1997 Utah Laws 522, 522-23
(codified as amended at Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-3 (2006)); and
2001, see Penalty for Misuse of Securities, ch. 14 9, sec. 1,
§ 61-1-21, 2001 Utah Laws 753, 753 (codi fied as amended at Utah
Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (2006)).

Wallace, 2006 UT 86, 150 P.3d 540, violates substantive due
process under the Utah and U.S. constitutions. We affirm.
f2
First, Candedo asserts that the trial court exceeded its
statutory authority by sentencing him to 108 months of probation.
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i). A trial court's
sentencing decision, including whether to grant or deny
probation, is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
See State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, % 14, 82 P.3d 1167.
"An abuse of discretion results when the judge fails to consider
all legally relevant factors or if the 'sentence imposed is
clearly excessive." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The
sentencing statute at issue here states that "[p]robation may be
terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon
completion without violation of 3 6 months probation in felony or
class A misdemeanor cases."2 Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) .
After reviewing section 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) in Wallace, the Utah
Supreme Court held that "our law currently provides no statutory
limitation on the length of probation a trial court may impose."
2006 UT 86, K 14 (emphasis added).
^3
Candedo argues that the Utah statute does not give a trial
court the authority to impose consecutive terms of probation, an
issue raised but not addressed in Wallace. See id. ^ 4.
However, this characterization of Candedofs sentence does not
accurately reflect the trial court's probation order. In the
sentencing order, the Order of Probation section specifies that
"[t]he defendant is placed on probation for 108 month(s)";
nowhere does that section use the term "consecutive."3 See State
v. Penney, 776 P.2d 91, 92-93 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("Where the
language of a judgment is clear and unambiguous, it must be given
effect as it is written. . . . Although, the judge may have
intended the terms to run consecutively, we do not examine his

2. In 1989, section 77-18-1 was amended--notably, "shall" became
"may"--as discussed in State v. Wallace. See 2006 UT 86, ^ 1011, 150 P.3d 540; see also Probation Amendments, ch. 226, sec. 1,
§ 77-18-1(7)(a), 1989 Utah Laws 689, 690 (codified as amended at
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) (Supp. 2007)) . Candedo was
sentenced under the current version of the statute.
3. Although the Probation Conditions section states that
"Defendant is sentenced to 36 months on each count," only the
Sentence Prison Concurrent/Consecutive Note section uses the term
"consecutive"; this note section also states that Defendant's
"[p]rison terms are concurrent with each other." In contrast,
the Order of Probation states merely that Candedo "is placed on
probation for 108 month(s)."
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intent where the written order is unequivocal." (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted))
%4
Even assuming that the juxtaposition of the Order of
Probation section and Probation Conditions section rendered this
order equivocal, Wallace indicates that imposing thirty-six
months for each count would nevertheless be within the trial
court's authority:
We granted certiorari on two issues: whether
section 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) creates a thirtysix-month limitation for a term of probation
as to any felony conviction; and whether
terms of probation for multiple convictions
may be imposed consecutively. Because we
conclude that the Legislature has not limited
terms of probation to any particular time
period, we need not and do not reach the
second issue.
2006 UT 86, f 4 (emphasis added). Wallace holds that there is
"no statutory time limitation on probation." Id. ^ 16. Because
a trial court is not time limited in its authority to impose
probation, see id. *h 14, the 108-month sentence is not "clearly
excessive." See Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, % 14.
Consequently, as in Wallace, we need not consider whetherassuming such a limitation did exist--the trial court could
circumvent that limit by ordering consecutive probation periods
where multiple crimes were committed. We hold that the trial
court did not exceed its discretion in sentencing Candedo to 108
months of probation.
%5
Second, Candedo argues that the probation statute, as
interpreted by Wallace, violates his due process rights under the
Utah and U.S. constitutions. Candedo concedes that he did not
properly preserve his due process argument in the trial court.
However, he asserts that he can still appeal this issue under
rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, or,
alternatively, under the exceptional circumstances doctrine. We
disagree with both of these contentions.
%6
Under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, an
appellate court "may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. Crim. P.
22(e), However, rule 22(e) only applies to a "'patently'" or
"'manifestly' illegal sentence," State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App
9, K 15, 84 P.3d 854 (quoting State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860
(Utah 1990); State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, % 5, 48 P.3d 228),
which the Utah Supreme Court has defined as occurring where
either "the sentencing court has no jurisdiction, or . .
the

20050899-CA
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sentence is beyond the authorized statutory range.'1 Id. (citing
Telford, 2002 UT 51, K 5 n.l). Here, there is no dispute that
the trial court had jurisdiction. Furthermore, in light of the
supreme court's statutory interpretation of section 77-181(10)(a)(i) and its holding that a "twelve-year probation does
not constitute an illegal sentence," State v. Wallace, 2006 UT
86, f 16, 150 P.3d 540, Candedo's nine-year probation is not an
illegal sentence. Therefore, Candedo's claim that his sentence
violates his due process rights is not reviewable under rule
22 (e) .
%1
Alternatively, Candedo argues that this court can review his
constitutional claim, despite his failure to raise it in the
trial court, under the exceptional circumstances doctrine. "The
exceptional circumstances concept serves as a 'safety device,' to
assure that 'manifest injustice does not result from the failure
to consider an issue on appeal.'" State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quoting State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920,
923 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)); see also State v. NeIson-Waggoner,
2004 UT 29, f 23, 94 P.3d 186 ("[The exceptional circumstances
doctrine is] reserv[ed] . . . for the most unusual circumstances
where our failure to consider an issue that was not properly
preserved for appeal would have resulted in manifest
injustice."). It is "used sparingly, properly reserved for truly
exceptional situations, for cases . . . involving 'rare
procedural anomalies.'" Irwin, 924 P.2d at 11 (quoting State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 12.09 n.3 (Utah 1993)); see, e.g., In re
T.M., 2003 UT App 191, fl 16, 73 P. 3d 959 (determining that an
"amendment [to the termination statute] was 'a change in law or
the settled interpretation of law'" and therefore "the
exceptional circumstances exception applie[d]" (emphasis added)).
Candedo argues that, because the Utah Supreme Court had not yet
held that trial courts could impose unlimited probationary
terms,4 he "'had no particular need to' argue the probation
statute violated substantive due process." (Quoting Irwin, 924
P.2d at 10.) He bases this argument on the inference from
decisions of the court of appeals, prior to Wallace, that there
were statutory limitations on probation. See State v. McDonald,
2005 UT App 86, 1 21, 110 P.3d 149 ("The probationary term for a
class C misdemeanor may not exceed twelve months pursuant to Utah
Code section 77-18-1 (10) (a) ( [i])." (emphasis omitted)), cert.
4. The Utah Court of Appeals and Utah Supreme Court had not
issued their respective opinions in State v. Wallace until after
the trial court entered its order sentencing Candedo to 108
months of probation. See Wallace, 2 0 06 UT 8 6 (issued Dec. 19,
2006), aff'g 2005 UT App 434, 124 P.3d 259 (issued Oct. 14,
2 005). The sentencing order at issue in this appeal is dated
September 12, 2005.

20050899-CA
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denied, 124 P.3d 251 (Utah 2005); State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d
979, 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (" [T] he maximum formal probation
periods for . . . a class B misdemeanor [] and . . . a class A
misdemeanor [] are respectively twelve months and thirty-six.
months . . . . " (citation omitted) ) . But see State v. Wallace,
2005 UT App 434, f 18 n.10, 124 P.3d 259 ("We are not bound by
cases which, in dicta,, assume without deciding that Utah Code
section 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) creates maximum probationary
periods."), aff f d, 2006 UT 86, 150 P.3d 540. However, we do not
find this argument sufficiently compelling to satisfy the
doctrine of exceptional circumstances.
%8
First, we fail to see how the supreme court's decision in
Wallace--by clarifying section 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) in a way that is
detrimental to Candedo1s 22(e) claim--supports the argument that
Candedo failed to raise his constitutional claim at trial because
of the previous decisions of this court. Although Candedo might
have believed that the trial court imposed an illegal
probationary term by exceeding the statutory limits allegedly
approved in McDonald and Robinson, we do not see how the
confidence in that claim interfered with his ability to evalu^. «
his due process argument. See McDonald, 2 0 05 UT App 86, % 21:
Robinson, 860 P.2d at 982. Candedo was always free to assert
both arguments in the trial court.5 Moreover, the fact that '
trial court imposed such a long period of probation--after
disagreeing with Candedo' s assertion that it did not have the
authority to do so--should have put Candedo on notice that his
due process rights were arguably implicated.6

5. Additionally, Candedo's reliance on State v. Lopez, 873 P. 2d
1127 (Utah 1994), is misplaced. In that case, the defendant's
argument under the exceptional circumstances doctrine succeeded
because the trial court initially ruled in his favor and, at that
time, "the pretext doctrine was the controlling rule of Fourth
Amendment law as interpreted by the court of appeals." Id. at
1130, 1134 & n.2. The court also noted that "[the d] ef endant had
no reason to argue that the doctrine be adopted under [the Utah
Constitution] until the State challenged the doctrine on appeal."
Id. at 1134 n.2,
6. We reiterate, however, this court's comment in State v.
Wallace, 2 0 05 UT App 4 34, affTd, 2 006 UT 86: "Defendant here did
not have to accept the terms of his probation. . . . [He] did
not choose incarceration. He chose probation and thereby
accepted its terms. Having accepted its terms, he now must abide
by them." Id. U 19 (citing State v. Allmendinger, 565 P. 2d 1119,
1121 (Utah 1 97^0 )
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^9
Furthermore, the constitutional limitations of probation
terms were not addressed in Wallace or either of the two cases
Candedo cites in support of his exceptional circumstances
argument. Even if Candedo reasonably believed that he could
later appeal the sentence under rule 22(e), he could have
asserted his due process claim as well. We will not expand the
exceptional circumstances exception to include Candedo's
situation as it does not rise to the level of a "rare procedural
anomal[y]." See Irwin, 924 P.2d at 11 (quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at
1209 n . 3 ) ; cf. State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994)
(refusing to address the defendant's due process claim on the
ground that he failed to preserve it and rejecting his argument
that exceptional circumstances existed where State v. Ramirez,
817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), decided after his trial, allegedly
would have supported his due process claim); see also State v.
Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1993) (refusing to address the
merits of the defendant's due process claim, which was based on
Ramirez's new constitutional requirements, because it was not
raised at trial--even though Ramirez issued after the defendant's
trial). See generally Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778, 780-81 (holding
that determination of "the due process reliability of eyewitness
identifications . . . . will require an in-depth appraisal of the
identification's reliability").7 We therefore hold that Candedo
did not preserve his due process argument and we do not address
it on appeal.
^10 The trial court did not exceed its discretion when it
sentenced Candedo to 108 months of probation. We do not address
Candedo's substantive due process argument because he failed to
preserve it and neither rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal

7. Candedo further asserts that we should review his due process
claim despite his failure to preserve it because "the issue
involves a question of law that can be easily reviewed for the
first time on appeal; judicial efficiency would be furthered by
reaching the issue now . . . / and justice would be served."
However, he cites no authority for these assertions, and we
therefore do not address them. See Peterson v. Sunrider Corp.,
2002 UT 43, 1| 23 n.9, 48 P.3d 918 ("We decline to address [the
defendant's] claim because it has not been properly
briefed. . . .
A single, vague sentence without citation to the
record or legal authority is inadequate." (citing State v.
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988))).
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6

Procedure nor the exceptional circumstances doctrine applies
under the facts of this case.
Ull

Affirmed.

fl2

WE CONCUR:

amela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

^

Gregorv>*K. (Jrme , Judge
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

—-ooOoo—S t a t e of U t a h ,

JUL 1 | pfjjfg

Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

Case No. 20080183-SC

Francisco A. Candedo,
Defendant and Petitioner.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed on March 3, 2008.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted as to the following issues.
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding Petitioner's due
process arguments could not be raised under rule 22 (e) of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding exceptional
circumstances did not justify treatment of Petitioner's due
process arguments on the merits.
3. Whether the imposition of a nine-year probationary term
violated Petitioner's right to due process.
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon
its issuance.
For The Court

Dated

~~1 ~l\~

°^
Matthew B. Durrant
Associate Chief Justice

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July 11, 2008, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or
placed in the Interdepartmental mail service, or hand delivered
to the parties listed below:
LORI J. SEPPI
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 E 500 S STE 300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
KENNETH A. BRONSTON
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
LISA COLLINS
COURT OF APPEALS
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 140230
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
ATTN: MARINA DAVIS & KIT SPENCER
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 18 60
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860
Dated this July 11, 2008.

By _
Dep-uty Clerk
Utah Supreme Court Case No. 20080183
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE Case No. 031900400
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U. S. Constitution Amendment XIV
Amendment 14 - Citizenship Rights. Ratified 7/9/1868.
1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for
President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the
Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion,
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and
Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any
State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of
the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall
assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against
the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such
debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article.

Utah Constitution Article I, Section VII
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 2005)
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in a b e y a n c e
— P r o b a t i o n — Supervision —• P r e s e n t e n c e investigation — Standards — Confidentiality —
Terms a n d conditions — Termination, revocation, modification, or extension — Hearings —
Electronic monitoring.
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyarjce, and under the terms of the
plea in abeyance agreement.
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction
of any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend
the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The
court may place the defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a
private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court,
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the
department is with the department.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court,
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These
"standards shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for sendees;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what
level of services shall be provided,
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures
to implement the supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and
other criteria as they consider appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations
subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors
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or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards.
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a
presentence investigation report from the department or information from
other sources about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact
statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the
effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the
department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the
defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims
Restitution Act.
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404,
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the
department.
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report
to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel,
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to
sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing
judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered
to be waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence,
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant.
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may
require that the defendant:
(a) perform any or all of the following:
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being
placed on probation;
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense
Costs;
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally
liable;
(iv) participate in available treatment programs, including any
treatment program in which the defendant is currently participating,
if the program is acceptable to the court;
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation
by the court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate;
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(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use
of electronic monitoring;
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-1120.7;
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment
services;
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with
interest in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims
Restitution Act; and
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers
appropriate; and
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997:
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the
defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the
diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being
placed on probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of:
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
(B) other justified cause.
(9) The department shall collect atid disburse the account receivable as
defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under
Section 64-13-21 during:
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection (10).
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B
or C misdemeanors or infractions,
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period
under Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance
upon the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the
court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the
payment of the account receivable.
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record
in the registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already
recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the
account to the Office of State Debt Collection,
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor,
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to
show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt
of court,
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of
State Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in
advance in all cases when termination of supervised probation will
occur by law.
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and
complete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable.
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(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to
revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated
at the hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon t h e filing of a
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or
warrant by the court.
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in
court that the probationer h a s violated the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the
court t h a t authorized probation shall determine if t h e affidavit
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or
extension of probation is justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to
be served on the defendant a warrant for his a r r e s t or a copy of the
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be
revoked, modified, or extended.
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant a t least five days prior
to the hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right
to be represented by counsel at the hearing a n d to have counsel
appointed for him if he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present
evidence.
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations
of the affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on t h e allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own
behalf, and present evidence.
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified,
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the
sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of
the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for t r e a t m e n t at the U t a h
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State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the
superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the
court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at
the state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13).
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2,
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the
presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of
the offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole;
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or
the subject's authorized representative; or
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime
on the victim or the victim's household.
(15) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5.
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred
to the department in accordance with Subsection (16).
(16) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order
of the court.
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts.
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions
which require:
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all
times; and
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored.
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this
section, it shall:
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the
Department of Corrections;
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the
residence of the defendant; and
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(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home
confinement to the department or the program provider.
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to
be indigent by the court.
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider.
History: C. 1953, 77-18-1, enacted by L.
3380, ch. 15, & 2; 1981, ch. 59, § 2: 1982, ch.
9, § 1; 1983, ch. 47, § 1; 1983, ch. 68, § 1;
1983, ch. 85, § 2; 1984, ch. 20, § 1; 1985, ch.
212, § 37; 1985, ch. 229, § 1; 1987, ch. 114,
§ 1; 1989, ch. 226, § 1; 1990, ch. 134, § 2;
1991, ch. 66, § 5; 1991, ch. 206, § 6; 1992, ch.
14, § 3; 1993, ch- 82, § 7; 1993, ch. 220, § 3;
1994, ch. 13, § 24: 1994, ch. 198, § 1; 1994,
ch. 230, § 1: 1995, ch. 20, § 146; 1995, ch.
117, § 2; 1995, ch. 184, § 1; 1995, ch. 301, § 3;
1995, ch. 337, § 11; 1995, ch. 352, § 6; 1996,

ch, 79, § 103; 1997, ch. 392, § 2; 1998, ch. 94,
§ 10; 1999, ch. 279, § 8; 1999, ch. 287, § 7;
2001, ch. 137, § l;2002,ch.35,§ 7; 2002 (5th
S.S.), ch. 8, § 137; 2003, ch. 290, § 3; 2005
(1st S.S.), ch. 14, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 2005 (1st S.S.)
amendment, effective July 1, 2005, added "including any treatment program in which the
defendant is currently participating, if the program is acceptable to the court" in Subsection
(8)(a)(iv).

Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1 (2003)

77-27-1.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Board" means the Board of Pardons and Parole.
(2) "Commission" means the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile
Justice.
(3) "Commutation" is the change from a greater to a lesser punishment
after conviction.
(4) "Department" means the Department of Corrections.
(5) "Expiration" occurs when the maximum sentence has run.
(6) "Family" means persons related to the victim as a spouse, child,
sibling, parent, or grandparent, or the victim's legal guardian.
(7) "Panel" means members of the board assigned by the chairperson to
a particular case.
(8) "Pardon" is an act of grace by an appropriate authority exempting a
person from punishment for a crime.
(9) "Parole" is a release from imprisonment on prescribed conditions
which, if satisfactorily performed by the parolee, enables the parolee to
obtain a termination of his sentence.
(10) "Probation" is an act of grace by the court suspending the imposition or execution of a convicted offender's sentence upon prescribed
conditions.
(11) "Reprieve or respite" is the temporary suspension of the execution
of the sentence.
(12) "Termination" is the act of an appropriate authority discharging
from parole or concluding the sentence of imprisonment prior to the
expiration of the sentence.
(13) "Victim" means:
(a) a person against whom the defendant committed a felony or
class A misdemeanor offense, and regarding which offense a hearing is
held under this chapter; or
(b) the victim's family, if the victim is deceased as a result of the
offense for which a hearing is held under this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 77-27-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1985, ch. 198, § 6; 1988, ch.
172, § 1; 1990, ch. 195, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 31;
1996, ch. 100, § 3.
Cross-References. — Board of Pardons,
governor's power to grant respites and re-

prieves, Utah Const., Art. VII, § 12.
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice, § 63-25a-101 et seq.
Termination or discharge of parolee from
s e x i t e n ce, § 76-3-202.
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 031900400 FS

FRANCISCO ANTONIO CANDEDO,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

STEPHEN L HENRIOD
September 12, 2005

PRESENT
Clerk:
lynm
Prosecutor: BARLOW, CHARLENE
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): BUGDEN JR, WALTER F
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: August 3, 1971
Audio
Tape Number:
22
Tape Count: 1100
CHARGES
SECURITIES FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/31/2005 Guilty
UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT
3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/31/2005 Guilty
UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/31/2005 Guilty
HEARING
TAPE: 22
COUNT: 1100
On record the defense objections to recommendations is heard.
COUNT: 1123
Victims testifies.
COUNT: 1146
Defense witnesses are heard.
COUNT: 1154
Sentencing.
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Case No: 031900400
Date:
Sep 12, 2005
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNREGISTERED SECURITIES
AGENT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNREGISTERED SECURITIES
AGENT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Prison terms are concurrent with each other.
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s)

SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
No credit for good time.
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Case No: 031900400
Date:
Sep 12, 2005
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine: $10000.00
Suspended: $10000.00

Charge # 2
Charge # 3
Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$10000.00
$10000.00
$0
$0
Plus Interest

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 108 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole,
Defendant to serve 3 65 day(s) jail.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Violate no laws.
Defendant is sentenced to 36 months on each count.
Defendant is to pay full restitution jointly and serverally. An
amount if agreed upon is to be filed with the court within 180 days
or a hearing will be set.
Defendant to pay a fine and surcharge of $10,000 which is
suspended.
Defendant is to serve 3 65 days jail with no credit for good time.
Defendant is to surrender passport.
^^tr^r^^
^
w 20 0$

CSTEPHEN L \

S'aqe 3 (last)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

0

STATE OF UTAH,

J

I\ i

Plaintiff,
Case No. 031900400

vs,
FRANCISCO A. CANDEDO,

ORIGINAL

Defendant.

Sentencing
Electronically Recorded on
September 12, 2005

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

N G ; - * 2005

i:

SALT LAKE COUNTY

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD
Third District Court Judge

Deputy Clerk

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

CHARLENE BARLOW
Asst. US Attorney
5272 S. College Dr. #200
Murray, UT 84123
Telephone: (801)281-1221

For the Defendant:

WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR.
623 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone: (801)467-1700

Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, CSR/CCT

1909 South Washington Avenue
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 377-0027
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sorry about that or not.

2

now.

3
4

THE COURT:

Did you get a paycheck the whole time you

were working?

5
6

I just decided to stay, and here we are

MR. CANDEDO:

No, actually the last four months I

didn't.

7

MR. BUGDEN:

8

MR. CANDEDO

9

MR. BUGDEN:

Were you ever paid a commission or bonuses?
No, I was not.
You were just salary?

10

MR. CANDEDO :

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. CANDEDO :

I was salary.

What was your salary?
It ended being 6500 a month, which is

13

about —

14

moved here.

15

sales manager for a company (inaudible) over there.

a little bit more than I was making in Mexico before I
In Mexico I was making $5,000 a month.

16

MR. BUGDEN:

17

THE COURT:

I was a

I think that's what we have to say.
Okay.

Thank you.

I have reviewed a great

18

deal of information on this, and I do not believe that Mr.

19

Candedo had the same level of responsibility as Ms. Cano,

20

although he has responsibility.

21

What I think is the most fair thing to do with him is to

22

have him serve some time, and then to work for a long time paying

23

as much money back as humanly possible.

24
25

I'm going to sentence him to one to five on the
securities fraud -- one to fifteen, excuse me, and zero to five

-351 I on the sales by an unlicensed broker and employing an unlicensed
2

broker —

3

concurrent sentences,
I'm going to suspend —

4

$10,000 plus surcharge.

5 I fine.

I'm also going to fine him

I'm going to suspend the prison and the

I'm going to order him to serve 365 days in Salt Lake

County jail and no credit for good time, no -- he could be
eligible for work release or ankle monitor, depending on the
jail's standards for that.
9 1
10

He is ordered to pay full restitution jointly and
severally.

I'm going to give the State 180 days to reach an

11 J agreement on the amount of restitution or to request a hearing
12

where we will determine the amount of restitution.

13

Surrender the passports.

All the normal conditions of

14

probation, which will be for 108 months.

15

each of the counts.

16

money that you've got to pay back.

17
18
19
20
21
22

That's nine years because of the amount of

No contact with Ms. Cano or any other defendant in this
case.

Any questions?
MR. BUGDEN:

Your Honor, may I just politely inquire, do

you have a power to -THE COURT:

I can give 36 months on each of three

felonies that he's convicted of.

23

MR. BUGDEN:

24

THE COURT:

25

That's 36 months on

Okay.
All right.

(Hearing concluded)

Thank you.
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Westlaw
Not Reported in P.3d
Not Reported in P.3d, 2002 WL 287890 (Utah App.), 2002 UT App 58

State v. Headley
Utah App.,2002.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT
RULES BEFORE CITING.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Thomas C. HEADLEY, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 990462-CA.
Feb. 28, 2002.
Edward R. Montgomery, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Thomas Brunker, Salt Lake
City, for appellee.
Before JACKSON, GREENWOOD, and THORNE,
JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
JACKSON, Presiding Judge.
*1 Thomas Headley appeals the district court's
denial of his Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence
submitted under Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. He contends the district court
erred in ruling that his motion did "not attack the
legality of the sentence imposed nor the manner in
which the sentence was imposed."Headley's contention is two-fold: (1) his counsel at sentencing
provided ineffective assistance; and (2) the sentencing court relied on information in the presentence
report that the court knew was false. We affirm.
A district court's Rule 22(e) decision is a legal
question that we review for correctness, see State v.
Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 858-59 (Utah 1995); State v.
Patience,
944
P.2d
381, 384-85
(Utah
Ct.App.1997), and we can affirm the decision "if it
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is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the rzcor&." State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10,
IT 31, 994 P.2d 1243. Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides for resentencing
when a sentence is illegal or "imposed in an illegal
manner." Utah R.Crim. P. 22(e). The definition of
an "illegal sentence" has been construed narrowly
to include only sentences "where the sentence does
not conform to the crime of which the defendant
has been convicted."FN1£tate v. Parker, 872 P.2d
1041, 1043 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1994). Utah law has
no comprehensive definition of sentences "imposed
in an illegal manner"; however, the Utah Supreme
Court has ruled that a sentence is imposed in an illegal manner when a defendant is deprived of his or
her Sixth Amendment right to counsel during sentencing.™ 2 ^ Kuehnert v.. Turner, 28 Utah 2d
150, 499 P.2d 839, 841 (1975) (concluding that the
sentence was illegal because the defendant did not
have counsel at sentencing, was not informed of his
Sixth Amendment rights during sentencing, and had
not knowingly and intelligently waived his Sixth
Amendment rights).™3 In Kuehnert, the Utah Supreme Court stated that the presence of counsel at
sentencing is necessary
FN1. Nonconforming sentences include
those where the sentence exceeds the statutory limits. See, e.g., State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 551 (Utah 1996)
(concluding that the sentence was illegal
because statute only authorized one year
enhancement and the court enhanced sentence by two years); State v. Patience, 944
P.2d 381, 388 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (noting
that the sentence was illegal because it exceeded statutory term). Nonconforming
sentences also occur when the court is
without jurisdiction to impose a sentence.
See, e.g., State v. Hurst, 111 P.2d 1029,
1036 n. 6 (Utah 1989) (stating that sentences can be attacked when beyond the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court); State
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v. Arviso, 1999 UT App 381, ffif 5-8, 993
P.2d 894 (stating that the sentence was illegal because Supremacy Clause deprived
sentencing court of jurisdiction); State v.
Grate, 947 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah
Ct.App.1997) (stating that the sentence
was illegal because court did not have jurisdiction to revoke probation).
FN2. Other jurisdictions have defined sentences imposed in an illegal manner as
those that are within statutory and jurisdictional limits, but violate a defendant's
rights, see, e.g., Government of the V.I. v.
Martinez, 239 F.3d 293, 299 n. 3 (3rd
Cir.2001); State v. McNeills, 546 A.2d
292, 305-06 (Conn.Ct.App.1988); State v.
Sieler, 554 N.W.2d 447, 479 (S.D.1996);
cf. State v. Anderson, 661 P.2d 716, 720-24
(Haw.Ct.App.1983); State v. Brooks, 589
A.2d 444, 447 (Maine 1991); or that are
based on erroneous information. See, e.g.,
United States v. Katzin, 824 F .2d 234, 238
(3rd Cir. 1987).
FN3.Kuehnert, which discusses illegal sentences under the rules in force prior to
Rule 22(e), was not cited in the parties' briefs.
so that there is a real opportunity to present to the
court facts in extenuation of the offense or in explanation of the defendant's conduct, as well as to
correct any errors or mistakes in reports of the defendant's past record and to appeal to the equity of
the court in its administration and enforcement of
penal laws.
M a t 840-4 l.FN4
FN4.&e also McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S.
2, 4, 89 S.Ct. 32, 33-34 (1968) ("As we
said in Mempa [v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128,
135, 88 S.Ct. 254, 257 (1967) ], 'the necessity for the aid of counsel in marshaling
the facts, introducing evidence of mitigating circumstances[,] and in general aiding
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and assisting the defendant to present his
case as to sentence is apparent.'The right
to counsel at sentencing must, therefore, be
treated like the right to counsel at other
stages of adjudication."(Citation omit- ted.)).
Headley first claims his counsel at sentencing
provided ineffective assistance, thus depriving him
of his Sixth Amendment right. To support his
claim, Headley makes six assertions, four are as
follows: (1) he asserts that his challenge to misinformation in the presentence investigation report
was rejected by the sentencing court because it was
poorly handled by sentencing counsel; (2) he challenges several factual statements contained in the
presentence investigation report; (3) he asserts that
"his own counsel accused him of being involved in
incest when that information was not otherwise before the court"; and (4) he asserts that "his
[sentencing] counsel convinced a witness with potentially exculpatory evidence not to cooperate with
[Headley]." Each of these four assertions has some
connection with the presentence investigation report, which is not in the record on appeal. Further,
no other information in the record supports these
assertions. Accordingly, as discussed below, we are
unable to address them.
*2 Next, Headley claims the sentencing court imposed a $10,000 fine without reason and without
objection by his counsel. We find no mention of a
$10,000 fine in the record. The only fines mentioned in the sentencing context, a $1,000 recoupment fee and an unspecified amount to "pay for
costs of extradition and for therapy of victim," are
found in the sentencing transcript and the Judgment
filed three days later. Finally, Headley alleges that
"his counsel intentionally tried to prevent him from
pursuing an appeal."However, the record reflects
that Headley filed a notice of appeal on September
24, 1992, but voluntarily moved to dismiss his appeal to "file a motion to withdraw his plea of
guilty."Headley's motion was granted on October 8,
1992, and the record contains no indication of sub-
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sequent attempts to appeal the case.
Without the presentence report or other information
which may or may not be in the sentencing court
record, the record submitted to us is inadequate for
our review of Headley's ineffective assistance
claim. All we have are Headley's unilateral, bald assertions of misconduct. As we have stated,
When a defendant predicates error to [an appellate
court], he has the duty and responsibility of supporting such allegation by an adequate record. Absent that record, a defendant's assignment of error
stands as a unilateral allegation which the reviewing court has no power to determine. [An appellate
court] simply cannot rule on a question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the record. Consequently, in the face of an
[in] adequate record on appeal, [we] must assume
the regularity of the proceedings below.
State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (1998)
(internal
quotations
and
citations
omitted)
(alterations in original); see also State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 17, 12 P.3d 92 ("Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities
or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be
construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively."). Accordingly, we reject Headley's Sixth Amendment claim.
Next, Headley claims the sentencing court was
biased because it relied on information in the
presentence report that the court knew was false.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (Supp.2001) gives a
sentencing judge discretion in evaluating information in a presentence report and requires the judge
to "make a determination of relevance and accuracy
on the record."Here, the sentencing judge made a
determination of the relevance and accuracy of the
presentence report, deciding the presentence report
was "comprehensive in all the details," and stating
that those working on elements of the presentence
report "do a pretty good job." The sentencing court
has broad discretion to resolve factual disputes for
or against a defendant, see id., and we cannot say

PageS

the court exceeded its discretion in making this determination. Further, without the presentence report, the record is inadequate and " '[we] must assume the
regularity
of the
proceedings
below.' " Penman, 964 P.2d at 1162 (citation omitted) (alteration in original).
*3 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial
of Headley's Rule 22(e) motion for resentencing.
WILLIAM
A.
THORNE
JR.,
J.,
concur.GREENWOOD, Judge (concurring in the result).
I concur in the result reached by my colleagues, but
would affirm on what I perceive to be a more
straightforward basis. As stated by the majority, the
trial court denied defendant's Rule 22(e) motion because the motion did "not attack the legality of the
sentence imposed nor the manner in which the sentence was imposed.'The trial court was correct.
Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel and erroneous fact findings by the sentencing judge are simply not cognizable under Rule
22(e). Defendant has not cited any caselaw holding
otherwise and has also not offered any reasoned
analysis for why Rule 22(e) should apply to his
case. See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah
1998) (briefs must include "reasoned analysis based
on [cited] authority"). The sentence imposed was
permissible under applicable statutes, and the trial
court properly resolved factual disputes presented
to it. Defendant raises no claims legitimately related to whether the sentence was illegal or
"imposed in an illegal manner." Utah R.Crim. P.
22(e). On that basis, I would affirm.
Utah App.,2002.
State v. Headley
Not Reported in P.3d, 2002 WL 287890 (Utah
App.), 2002 UT App 58
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